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ne story is well known: In the early
morning hours of August 29, 2005,
a ferocious hurricane slammed into
the Mississippi Gulf Coast. By 8 a.m., the eye
of the storm had passed 40 miles southeast of
the central business district of the city of New
Orleans. Within hours, violent storm surges
broke through the system of levees and flood-
walls designed to protect the city, and water
began emptying into the city basin, eventually
rising in some places to 20 feet. By the time the
water leveled off, about 80 percent of the city
was inundated and would remain that way for
the next four to six weeks.
The scale of the physical disaster and the
immensity of human suffering, caused ini-
tially by Hurricane Katrina and then exacer-
bated three weeks later by Hurricane Rita,
were staggering. In all, some 90,000 square
miles in five heavily populated Gulf Coast
states were physically destroyed. In New
Orleans itself, 1,500 people were dead, and
more than 250,000 homes were either
destroyed or considered unlivable. The extent
of the devastation to a major American city
was unprecedented in modern times.
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Katrina exposed the city’s deepest flaws to
the world, laying bare the grinding poverty
and segregation that had created an entrenched
and vulnerable population in New Orleans.
Long before the last of the floodwaters were
pumped out, it became apparent that while
many neighborhoods were struck hard, low-
income and minority communities had been
hit the hardest, and faced the most formidable
recovery prospects. 
But there is another story, less well known:
the monumental challenge of urban planning
that lay ahead. As residents began to trickle
back, determined to launch the rebuilding
process, the tasks were immediate and daunt-
ing. How could a city begin to recover after a
disaster of such cataclysmic force and devasta-
tion? Perhaps more to the point, what exactly
does it recover?
Recovering after disaster
Cities are characterized not only by their
buildings and infrastructure—they are
fundamentally composed of interlocking
relationships, types of leadership, social 
and political activities, historic legacies and
attitudes, and particular ways of getting
things done. In the weeks and months to
come, all these would come into play as 
New Orleans confronted the most complex
challenge in its 300-year history.
Within days of Katrina, the Rockefeller
Foundation made more than $3 million in
commitments aimed at the rebuilding of New
Orleans. The grants were made to proven
community-development and housing inter-
mediaries that were pursuing strategies for
housing and businesses. Nearly all other lead-
ing foundations collectively pledged hundreds
of millions of dollars as well, and money and
other resources flowed in from a wide range of
donors to support immediate relief efforts.
But as attention began to focus on longer-
range challenges, a number of factors partic-
ular to New Orleans came to the forefront.
Despite its rich and vibrant culture, pre-
Katrina New Orleans was one of the poorest
cities in the U.S. For decades leading up to
the hurricane, the city’s manufacturing base
had atrophied, leaving a weak employment
environment, diminished tax revenues and
widespread poverty, along with a legacy of
failing education and health care—a variety
of large holes in the social safety net.
[2] Katrina exposed the city’s deepest flaws to the world, laying
bare the grinding poverty and segregation that had created
an entrenched and vulnerable population.
Devastation in the Lower Ninth Ward.
[3]The reconstruction process held out the prospect of a better
city—one that would be more open and collaborative, and
that would extend more opportunities to its residents…
Huge swaths of the city were characterized
by lower-income, segregated neighborhoods,
mostly African-American, with dilapidated
housing and high crime rates. Politically, the
city was steeped in an old world culture of
insularity and patronage, with little precedent
of cooperation between city and state officials.
Reconstructing such a city would mean
accepting profound changes to its identity.
More than rebuilding the shattered infrastruc-
ture, more than replacing streets and sewers,
schools and parks, it would mean acknowledg-
ing that the new city would be a different place,
with possibly fewer residents, a different eco-
nomic base, perhaps a somewhat different sense
of itself. At the same time, the reconstruction
process held out the prospect of a better city—
one that would be more open and collabora-
tive, and that would extend more opportunities
to its residents for self-determination. Yet the
path to achieve those goals was uncertain. As
New Orleans community organizer Barbara
Major put it, “How do you rebuild a city with
equity? There is no manual.”
A city’s identity changes
In these dire circumstances, the city’s planning
process got under way. It began with citizen
action. By late September 2005, in some
neighborhoods—mostly in the wealthier, less
ravaged areas—returning residents began tak-
ing matters into their own hands, meeting in
their living rooms, drawing up their own
plans and, in some cases, bringing in experts. 
In October, Mayor Ray Nagin established a
civic commission, called the Bring New
Orleans Back Commission. Within a short
time, the commission had hired a nonprofit
research and education group, the Urban
Land Institute (ULI), to make large-scale land
use suggestions for the future of the city. At
the core of the ULI proposals, presented at a
public forum in November, was that rebuild-
ing should begin on higher ground in the less-
damaged neighborhoods, and that the city’s
footprint should shrink to adapt to the new
environmental realities.
The plan immediately ignited a furor.
Members of the Bring New Orleans Back
Commission were shouted down as “land
thieves” for proposing to eliminate neighbor-
hoods in some of the city’s lowest-lying
ground. Many residents in some of the areas
responded with hostility to the suggestion that
their neighborhoods—New Orleans East, the
Lower Ninth Ward and Gentilly—would be
abandoned for green space. To some, such
proposals seemed to represent how some resi-
dents of the city had historically been
exploited pre-Katrina, and were again being
exploited post-Katrina. 
Within weeks, the plan had run into so
much opposition it was discarded, and the
mayor eventually made the decision that all
neighborhoods in New Orleans would be
allowed to rebuild.
[4]
Meanwhile, the Governor had established
the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA) to
coordinate the statewide redevelopment
response to Katrina and Rita, including rais-
ing private underwriting funds, retaining pro-
fessional planners and moving toward a
comprehensive statewide recovery plan. The
LRA, by congressional mandate, would also
serve as the conduit for federal relief funds for
long-term recovery.
Teams of professional planners hired by the
LRA began the planning process for storm-
ravaged parishes across the coast of South
Louisiana, with the sole exception of Orleans
Parish, the parish that is the city of New
Orleans. The Mayor had indicated that the
city of New Orleans would not be part of the
LRA planning effort. Rather, the Commission
would initiate a new planning process to be
underwritten by FEMA.
By January, yet another planning process
was initiated, this time by the New Orleans
City Council, which hired its own planning
firm to focus only on the so-called “wet”
neighborhoods. That was the designation
given to those areas that had been covered
with at least two feet of water—criteria that
excluded 31 of the city’s 73 neighborhoods.
Rather than a coherent and comprehensive
plan, what was emerging was a patchwork of
planning activities. It was characterized by
flashes of energy and enterprise as weeks went
by and more and more residents streamed
back to the city. As a New York Times article
later observed, there was an urge to rebuild
“that is as primal as the force that pushes grass
up through the cracks in the sidewalk.”
Determined individuals were obtaining
building permits and getting down to work
on their homes. 
At the same time, the process was riddled
with uncertainty. Still unresolved were critical
questions about funding, FEMA flood maps
and land elevation, insurance, and whether
neighborhoods would ever achieve the density
necessary to sustain reconstruction.
Perhaps it was inevitable, given the scale of
the disaster and the multiplicity of players, that
the process would eventually run into a log-
jam. To create a successful New Orleans plan,
there needed to be a unified, cooperative and
communally spirited planning process. A
healthy, functional New Orleans could never
emerge by cobbling together 73 different
neighborhood plans without comprehensive
guidelines. Successful municipalities require an
interrelated network of city-wide resources
such as transportation, sewage, drainage, tran-
sit, utilities, parks, hospitals and schools. That’s
not what was operating in New Orleans in
early 2006. What was needed was a vision and
the mandate to chart a future course for the
entire city.
As a New York Times article later observed, there was an
urge to rebuild “that is as primal as the force that pushes
grass up through the cracks in the sidewalk.”
A unified planning process 
Lacking in New Orleans was a force that
would bring all the disparate parts together.
The mayor’s office, the city council, the
LRA—each had its own priorities, its own
vision of the future. All too often, those visions
did not mesh, and there was little inclination
to accommodate. People were entrenched in
their positions. 
In January, FEMA notified Mayor Nagin
that it would not provide the funds necessary
to underwrite the planning process. Given the
lack of public resources, the mayor, his Com-
mission and many local leaders began to rec-
ognize the urgent need for some sort of private
assistance to advance the process.
In late March, the LRA and the Greater
New Orleans Foundation (GNOF), an estab-
lished community foundation, invited the
Rockefeller Foundation’s director of domestic
programs, Darren Walker, to New Orleans to
discuss the possibility of funding assistance. 
This was a commitment that fit squarely into
the Rockefeller Foundation’s philanthropic
agenda. For nearly half a century, the health of
American cities has been at the heart of the
Foundation’s domestic programs. A wide-rang-
ing program in promoting urban design studies
spurred the creation of new departments at a
number of leading universities, and Jane
Jacobs’s landmark book, The Death and Life
of Great American Cities, was funded by a
[5]For nearly half a century, the health of American cities has
been at the heart of the Foundation’s domestic programs. 
The French Quarter empty of nightlife.
Rockefeller Foundation grant. Through our
grantmaking, the Foundation aspires to make
material improvements in the lives and oppor-
tunities of poor or vulnerable people. 
Walker accepted the invitation to the meet-
ing, with the proviso that it be an inclusive
gathering, one that would be attended by key
players across the spectrum: representatives of
the governor’s and the mayor’s offices, local
philanthropic groups, community organizers,
business leaders, neighborhood activists—a
true reflection of the city’s diverse interests.
In late March, all these constituents gathered
in a conference room in GNOF’s offices on the
edge of downtown New Orleans. As GNOF’s
president and CEO Ben Johnson observed, “It
was like bringing together all the different
spokes of the wheel to focus on the hub.” 
Out of that meeting emerged two elements
that would jump-start the planning process
and focus efforts on a more comprehensive
effort. First, a Rockefeller Foundation grant,
eventually pegged at $3.5 million, was made
to the GNOF. That commitment immedi-
ately triggered a grant from the GNOF itself
for an additional $1 million, bringing to $4.5
million the total committed to a new plan.
[6]
Clean-up crew in a destroyed home.
Second, the Rockefeller Foundation recruited
and dispatched a program officer to New
Orleans to oversee the administration of the
grant and serve as a resource for local stake-
holders. Carey Shea was a seasoned community-
development expert well versed in the
complexities of urban planning. A one-time
homeowner in New Orleans, she was also an
outsider whose neutrality would eventually
emerge as a powerful organizational asset. The
ability of a leading individual to serve as a
sounding board would prove to be invaluable
as the process—now known as the Unified
New Orleans Plan—was nudged forward. 
The Rockefeller grant, then, represented an
unusual form of public/private partnership,
one that helped align the critical players, from
the state and the regional to the local level,
and served as a powerful catalyst for change.
A public/private partnership
Over the weeks and months that followed,
many observers began to notice a shift taking
place in New Orleans, a rearrangement of the
fundamental way that things were done. A
multitude of stakeholders, driven by the
imperative to revive their city, and fueled by
an impatience with the discord and dysfunc-
tion that had prevailed for so many years,
began to plan consensually.
No longer would they tolerate destructive
squabbling among various constituents while
thousands of their fellow citizens were still liv-
ing in trailers, desperate to rebuild their
homes. People were determined to bring a
new level of transparency and urgency to city
planning. Things were going to be different.
The financial resources of the Rockefeller
Foundation, together with a neutral individ-
ual on the ground, served as the fulcrum of a
lever that could propel the city into a new
direction, infused with hope and optimism,
but tempered by the reality of overcoming
long-standing divisions based on race and
class. One leading urban planner called it “a
stunning sequence of events.”
Beginning in early August 2006, the GNOF
and its new New Orleans Community Sup-
port Foundation opened the doors to a series
of public meetings, with the objective of select-
ing the planners who would help determine
the look and shape of the emerging city, from
streets and sidewalks to bus routes, schools,
parks and libraries. The mayor, governor, state
Recovery Authority and City Council were
finally working together to advance the Uni-
fied New Orleans Plan, which will, when com-
pleted and submitted to the LRA, release
critically needed federal recovery funds.
Where does the rebuilding of New Orleans
stand today? After months of frustration and
struggle, the planning process is advancing,
fueled by increased civic dialogue, broad-
based participation and a commitment to col-
lective accountability.
[7]The Rockefeller grant represents an unusual form of
public/private partnership…and serves as a powerful 
catalyst for change.
 
Returning to a house unmoored.
The immense challenge facing New Orleans impels all involved
to recognize their mutual interests and interdependence… 
[8]
Even so, the Unified New Orleans Plan
entails considerable risk for all involved, for
there can be no guarantee of ultimate success.
Without doubt, some of the old frictions
remain. Entrenched patterns, characterized by
race and class divides, cannot so easily be dis-
solved. In a city still marked by suffering, in
which many thousands are still displaced and in
distress, and where emotions are still raw, there
will continue to be good days, and less good
days. The process remains at times disjointed.
Many local institutions and some local leaders
continue to lack trust in one another.
Everyone knows that rebuilding New
Orleans will require an extraordinary amount of
hard work. But beyond that, as Martin Luther
King Jr. observed, all humanity is “caught in an
inescapable network of mutuality.”
The immense challenge facing New
Orleans impels all involved to recognize their
mutual interests and interdependence, and in
so doing, coalesce around a civic plan that will
carry their community into the future—
buoyed by the conviction that the people of
New Orleans deserve, and must have, a
brighter future. For New Orleans, after a long
and difficult year, it might be said that the
Unified New Orleans Plan heralds the end of
the beginning.
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